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Abstract
Greenberger, Horne, Shimony and Zeilinger gave a new version of
the Bell theorem without using inequalities (probabilities). Mermin
summarized it concisely; but Bohm and Hiley criticized Mermin’s proof
from contextualists’ point of view. Using the Branching Space-time
language, in this paper a proof will be given that is free of these diffi-
culties. At the same time we will also clarify the limits of the validity
of the theorem when it is taken as a proof that quantum mechanics
is not compatible with a deterministic world nor with a world that
permits correlated space-related events without a common cause.
1 Greenberger, Horne, Shimony, Zeilinger and
Mermin
Greenberger, Horne, Shimony and Zeilinger (1990) developed a proof of
the Bell theorem without using inequalities. Following Mermin, one can
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extract from their ideas not only a simple Kochen-Specker-like illustration
that there are quantities that have no values independently of the mea-
surements, but also some simple Bell-EPR like results emphasizing locality
(spatio-temporal) principles.
In the GHSZ example we consider three spin-half particles originated in
a gedanken spin-conserving decay flying apart along three different straight
lines in the horizontal plane. Let us denote the spin of particle i along its
direction of motion by 1
2
h¯σiz, the spin along the vertical direction by
1
2
h¯σix
and the spin along the horizontal direction orthogonal to the trajectory by
1
2
h¯σiy. Assume that the quantum state of the three-particle system is
Ψ =
1√
2
(∣∣∣11z
〉
⊗
∣∣∣12z
〉
⊗
∣∣∣13z
〉
−
∣∣∣−11z
〉
⊗
∣∣∣−12z
〉
⊗
∣∣∣−13z
〉)
(1)
where σiz
∣∣1iz
〉
=
∣∣1iz
〉
and σiz
∣∣−1iz
〉
=
∣∣−1iz
〉
. In this state, the possible
measurement results can be R(σax) = ±1 and R(σay) = ±1 for a = 1, 2, 3.
Consider now the following operators:
Ω1 = σ
1
xσ
2
yσ
3
y
Ω2 = σ
1
yσ
2
xσ
3
y (2)
Ω3 = σ
1
yσ
2
yσ
3
x
Ω4 = σ
1
xσ
2
xσ
3
x.
The only known way to measure these quantities is to perform the mea-
surements σ1x, σ
2
y , σ
3
y and σ
1
y , σ
2
x, σ
3
y , etc., and to take the product of the
correponding results. Of course, the quantum state Ψ does not determine
the measurement results R(σ1x), R(σ
2
y), R(σ
3
y), R(σ
1
y), R(σ
2
x), R(σ
3
y), . . . . But
we can know in advance each R(Ωi)! The state Ψ is an eigenstate of Ω1,Ω2
and Ω3 with eigenvalue 1. Ψ is an eigenstate of Ω4, too, with eigenvalue −1.
Consequently, in any measurement of these quantities the results are
R (Ω1) = R (Ω2) = R (Ω3) = −R (Ω4) = 1 (3)
which implies a constraint on the measurement results for the spin-components
of the three separated particles. This constraint provides, what we shall
call an inconsistency-type correlation among the outcomes at the three sta-
tions; that is, there are combinations of outcomes that are not possible, even
though each individual outcome is possible.
The measurement results R(Ωi) are fixed in advance. That is why, ac-
cording to the minimal understanding of a “value” assigned to a quantum
2
observable, one may say that the values of Ω1, . . .Ω4 are
V (Ω1) = V (Ω2) = V (Ω3) = −V (Ω4) = 1 (4)
Consider now the product of these operators
Ω = Ω1Ω2Ω3Ω4. (5)
Ψ is an eigenstate of Ω too with eigenvalue −1. This fact is consistent with
V (Ω1)V (Ω2)V (Ω)V (Ω4) = −1, (6)
that is,
V (σ1xσ
1
yσ
1
y)V (σ
1
yσ
1
xσ
1
y)V (σ
1
yσ
1
yσ
1
x)V (σ
1
xσ
1
xσ
1
x) = −1. (7)
And the same holds for the measurement results
R(σ1xσ
1
yσ
1
y)R(σ
1
yσ
1
xσ
1
y)R(σ
1
yσ
1
yσ
1
x)R(σ
1
xσ
1
xσ
1
x) = −1. (8)
Until now we did not do anything beyond standard quantum mechanics.
Here we come, however, to a Kochen-Specker-type argument. Let us make
an additional assumption and see whether it goes through or not: Assume
that we can assign values not only to the products σ1xσ
1
yσ
1
y, σ
1
yσ
1
xσ
1
y, . . ., but
also to the spin-operators σ1x, σ
1
y, σ
2
x, σ
2
y , σ
3
x, σ
3
y themselves, such that (7)
can be written as
V (σ1x)V (σ
2
y)V (σ
3
y)V (σ
1
y)V (σ
2
x)V (σ
3
y)
V (σ1y)V (σ
2
y)V (σ
3
x)V (σ
1
x)V (σ
2
x)V (σ
3
x) = −1. (9)
This is, however, impossible, because each V (σaj ) appears twice, so whatever
the values V (σaj ) are, the left hand side is a positive number, instead of −1.
In this way, one finds evidence against the idea of pre-existing values for the
quantities σaj .
From the Kochen-Specker point of view locality considerations are ab-
sent or not so important. From the EPR point of view, one takes into
account that the various measurements are distant, and finds evidence that
in spite of the correlations among them, there are no “elements of reality”
corresponding to the values V (σai ). One uses the term “element of real-
ity” partly because one thinks of a pre-settled value of a physical quantity
as corresponding to an objective feature of our world, a feature that exists
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independently of the measurement that reveals it. Another reason is that
V (σai ) seems to satisfy the often-quoted EPR reality criterion: “If, without
in any way disturbing a system, we can predict with certainty the value of
a physical quantity, then there exists an element of physical reality corre-
sponding to this physical quantity.” By virtue of the spatial separation of
the three measurements, one can predict any of V (σai ) , without apparent
disturbance of the system, by carrying out two suitable measurements on
the other two particles. (See Mermin (1990a)).
Since the values of the spin-components cannot be prearranged in ad-
vance before the measurements, the individual experiments cannot merely
reveal values settled in advance. In this sense one can use the GHSZ exam-
ple in the Bell-EPR-common cause context, too: The non-existence of pre-
arranged values/measurement outcomes seems to imply the non-existence
of a common cause that can account for all the correlations provided by
the constraint (3). In the remainder of this paper we will be discussing
the GHSZ example in this context. In order to establish the correctness of
the implication to no-common-cause, we use language that is more rigorous
than customary. In this way our discussion will not only provide a more
solid nonlocality theorem, but will avoid the vulnerable points about which
the contextualists’ complaints have been made.
2 Contextualists’ criticism
From the contextualists’ point of view the above proof is not completely
acceptable. Their critique is focused in the following remarks:
• From a contextualist point of view any Kochen-Specker-type argu-
ment is vacuous. The disagreement (9), for example, proves the non-
existence of values, the existence of which has never been assumed by
a contextual theory, such as the Bohm mechanics. The ”beables”, if
they exist, determine the result of each individual measurement op-
eration. But these results are not present before the measurement
operations have been completed.
• The Bell-EPR or the Bell-EPR-common cause context concerns the
question of what we can tell about the measurement results
R(σ1x), R(σ
1
y), . . . R(σ
1
x).
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To avoid a contradiction analogous to (9),
R(σ1x)R(σ
2
y)R(σ
3
y)︸ ︷︷ ︸
1
R(σ1y)R(σ
2
x)R(σ
3
y)︸ ︷︷ ︸
1
R(σ1y)R(σ
2
y)R(σ
3
x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
1
R(σ1x)R(σ
2
x)R(σ
3
x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
−1
= −1, (10)
the measurement results must be context dependent in the sense that,
for example, R(σ1x) cannot be the same in the first place, when σ
1
x is
assumed to be measured along with σ2y and σ
3
y , as it is in the second
place when it is measured with σ2x and σ
3
x (see Bohm and Hiley 1993).
So, it would be better to use a special index, to express the context in
which the measurement is completed:
Rxyy(σ
1
x)Rxyy(σ
2
y)Rxyy(σ
3
y)︸ ︷︷ ︸
1
Ryxy(σ
1
y)Ryxy(σ
2
x)Ryxy(σ
3
y)︸ ︷︷ ︸
1
Ryyx(σ
1
y)Ryyx(σ
2
y)Ryyx(σ
3
x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
1
Rxxx(σ
1
x)Rxxx(σ
2
x)Rxxx(σ
3
x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
−1
= −1, (11)
Such an expression is not contradictory at all.
One might argue that Rxyy(σ
1
x), for example, should be the same as
Rxxx(σ
1
x), because of the spatial separation of the three stations. There
is no influence on the measurement at station 1 of the choices among
the possible measurements at the other two stations. But this is ir-
relevant. It is a matter of fact that Rxyy(σ
1
x) differs from Rxxx(σ
1
x).
These two measurements belong to different runs of the experiment.
We agree that both of the above remarks are relevant, but we think
that this is not the last word. In the following sections we will present a
reformulation of Mermin version of the GHSZ thought-experiment. It will
avoid vague notions such as “value of a quantity”, concentrating on the
Bell-EPR-common cause context only. Instead,
1. we will reformulate the problem using only some elementary ob-
jects, such as events and their causal relations,
2. in this language we will describe exactly what it could mean to
say that there is no common-cause explanation of inconsistency-
type correlations among separated spin measurements,
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3. and we will refer to the observed correlations among the separated
spin measurements results only in such a way that everything will
have a correct empirical meaning.
On this purified basis, we will give an airtight proof that in a certain
limited sense, the GHSZ thought-experiment does in fact imply a violation
of the common-cause principle.
3 Basics of the branching space-time theory
Our formulation will use some of the very basic elements of the Branching
Space-time Theory (BST). The aim of this theory was to solve the problem:
How can we combine relativity and indeterminism in a rigorous theory?
The underlying idea is that a true description of our world may require
fusing Einstein spacetime with Prior/Thomason branching time. For further
motivation and details of BST we refer to Belnap 1992.
From BST we rely on the following postulates and definitions on the
primitives 〈Our World,<〉, where Our World is the totality of (possible)
point events connected to us by a succession of causal paths, and < is an
adaptation of the causal ordering relation among space-time points (the
existence of a time-like or light-like path) to the domain of possible point
events. We stress that no other primitives whatsoever figure in our discus-
sion.
Postulate OurWorld is postulated to be a nonempty set; its members are
called point events. < is postulated a dense partial order on Our World
such that every nonempty lower bounded chain has an infimum. A history
is defined as a subset h of Our World maximal with respect to the property
that if h contains two point events, then it contains an upper bound for them.
It is postulated that each nonempty upper bounded chain has a supremum
in each history of which it is a subset. A choice point for two histories is
defined as a point event maximal in their intersection. Given any nonempty
lower bounded chain E of point events in h1 − h2, it is postulated that there
is at least one choice point e1 for h1 and h2 such that e1 < e2 for all e2 ∈ E
(this is the “prior choice principle”). An event is defined as a nonempty
set of point events.
A good picture to have in mind is that each history is a space-time
of General Relativity that is free from causal degeneracy (for example the
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Minkowski space-time). We do not use anything of the more detailed ge-
ometry of a space-time beyond its causal structure. So, if we wish, we can
regard a history at a more abstract level as a causal space of point events
satisfying the Kronheimer-Penrose (1967) axioms. The postulates above,
especially the prior choice principle, constrain how these histories branch
one from the other. The details are not, however, pertinent. We add the
following definitions for current purposes.
Definition 3.1 An initial event I is a nonempty upper bounded chain. An
outcome event O is a nonempty lower bounded chain. A stable event is
both initial and outcome, and is contained in every history it overlaps.
Initial events represent situations that can have any one of a variety of out-
comes, which are represented by outcome events. Both initial and outcome
events have definite loci in Our World; but the two sorts of events have
different structures.
Initial events and outcome events, because of their respective structures,
can fit together into “spreads.” Roughly speaking, a spread – which we are
going to define just below – consists in a single initial event, and a variety
of individually possible but mutually inconsistent outcomes of that initial.
A spread with its outcomes is one way of representing an “experiment” and
its possible outcomes. It also sometimes makes sense to think of a spread
as a choice-situation for an experimenter, with the outcomes representing
the available choices. The meaning of a spread is, however, more general; it
can describe any kind of indeterministic situation without implying either
the presence or the absence of any human activity at the “preparation”
of the initial event or “observation” of the outcomes. Thus the following
formulation draws no distinction between the “a measurement process” and
any other process going on in Our World:
Definition 3.2 A spread σ is an ordered pair the first member of which is
an initial event I and the second of which is a nonempty set Ω of outcome
events; we write σ = I → Ω. Each spread must satisfy the following three
conditions:
i. I causally precedes each O ∈ Ω.
ii. Every history containing I overlaps some O ∈ Ω.
iii. No history overlaps two distinct members of Ω.
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Thus given any historical course in which the initial event I comes to
a close, exactly one of the outcome events in Ω commences. In all cases
spreads have two features: (i) they have a definite locus in Our World;
and (ii) their internal structure has a definite causal structure, since their
mutually inconsistent “outcomes” are located after their initials in the causal
ordering.
We next define an “n-spread” with its “outcome vectors” in order to give
us a convenient way of simultaneously considering a number of experiments
and their possible results.
Definition 3.3 An n-spread is a finite sequence of spreads:
Σ = {σi = Ii → Ωi}i=1,2,...,n
The collection of the initial events {I1, I2, ..., In} is called the set of initials
of Σ. An outcome vector O is a vector whose ith term is one of the outcomes
of the ith spread of Σ, O ∈ Ω1 × Ω2 × · · · ×Ωn.
The next definition uses the expressive power of BST to give an exact
account of what it means to say that a set of events is “consistent.”
Definition 3.4 A set of initial and outcome events is said to be consistent
if there is a history that contains each of its initial events and overlaps each
of its outcome events. An outcome vector is said to be consistent if its terms
form a consistent set of outcome events.
Observe that there is an important difference in how initial events and out-
come events enter into consistency-relations: In the history in question,
initial events must finish, while outcome events must begin. Given the dif-
ference in their structures, that is to be expected.
We also distinguish several senses of “consistency” of an n-spread Σ.
Definition 3.5 Σ is minimally consistent if its set of initials is consistent,
and maximally consistent if all of its outcome vectors are consistent. And
Σ is 1-consistent if its set of initials is consistent with each single outcome
of each of its spreads in the following sense: for each outcome event O ∈ Ωi,
where 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the set of events {I1, I2, ..., In, O} is consistent.
Lastly, in contrast to the language available in most discussions of Bell-
like phenomena, the language of BST permits us to say with absolute rigor
what it is for a set of experimental situations to be spatially separated.
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Definition 3.6 Σ is space-like iff it is minimally consistent, and no initial
of one of its spreads causally precedes any outcome of a distinct spread.
The following sums up what will be used explicitly.
Fact 1 Let σ be a spread, let Σ be an n-spread, and let E be an initial or
outcome event of Σ.
• E is consistent with the initial of σ if and only if E is consistent with
some outcome of σ.
• E is consistent with the set of initials of an n-spread if and only if E
is consistent with some outcome vector of Σ.
• If E is consistent with a set of initials and outcomes, then E is con-
sistent with each element of the set.
• If Σ is maximally consistent then it is 1-consistent. If it is 1-consistent
then it is minimally consistent.
Using the definitions just given, BST suggests the following partial (and
pre-probabilistic) analysis of the concept of the “common cause.” The idea
is that the question of a common cause does not arise unless you are given
a spacelike n-spread Σ that is 1-consistent, so that the joint coming to a
close of its initials is consistent with each outcome of each of its spreads.
(One does not even look for a common cause if there is a violation of 1-
consistency; if, that is, an otherwise possible outcome of one the experiments
is prevented merely by initializing the other experiments.) But you are
also given an outcome vector C that is inconsistent – in spite of the fact
that each term of C is consistent with the set of initials of Σ. It is this
combination that raises a question. And when the question does arise, one
looks for a causal locus in the common past of the outcomes of spreads in
Σ. What one looks for can be understood in terms of Reichenbach’s (1956)
concept of “screening off,” here adapted to the language of consistency:
The inconsistency of C represents a “correlation” among the terms of the
n-spread, in spite of their space-like separation, and screening off makes the
“correlation” disappear in the context of each outcome of the common cause
σ. As a partial analysis, we collect the necessary conditions for a spread
to be a common cause for an inconsistent outcome vector. If our analysis
weren’t restricted to inconsistency-type correlations, we would perhaps need
to enrich or refine these conditions, but for present purposes the following
definition works out:
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Definition 3.7 Let σ be a spread, Σ a space-like n-spread that is 1-consistent,
and C an inconsistent outcome vector of Σ. σ is a common cause for C in
Σ only if
CC1. (Causal priority) The initial of σ is causally prior to every outcome of
every spread in Σ.
CC2. (Consistency) Each outcome of σ is consistent with the set of initials
of Σ.
CC3. (Screening off of inconsistency) σ “screens off” C. That is, each out-
come O of σ is inconsistent with some one term of C.
The expression “common cause for the inconsistent outcome vector C”
sounds a little awkward in ordinary language; we use it as short for some-
thing like “common causal locus for C” or “common-cause explanation
for C”. Whichever, it clearly and rigorously refers to an actual place in
Our World such that what happens there “explains away” the space-like
correlation represented by C.
4 BST formulation of the GHSZ-Mermin theo-
rem
We now turn to redescribing Mermin’s version of the GHSZ theorem in the
language of BST, dropping all language of particles, state, and systems. Nor
do we even use much of the language of BST itself, confining ourselves to the
notions introduced in the previous section. We shall, however, help ourselves
to heuristic interpretations, with the caution that the hard information is
contained in the explicit numbered stipulations below.
At each of the three “stations” 1, 2, or 3 there can be one of the two
“measurements” of σx or σy each of which can have one of two “outcomes”
− or +. We interpret this situation as follows. There are to begin with
three widely separated “pre-preparation” initial events I1, I2 and I3, with
the interpretations e.g.
I1: Station 1 has been pre-prepared (so to speak) so that it will be set to
measure either on the x axis or on the y axis (but not both).
Next, the pre-preparation initial I1 (for example) has two possible outcomes
x1 and y1, with the interpretation e.g.
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x1: Station 1 is prepared to measure on the x axis.
Now x1, for example, is not only an outcome event, but also an initial event,
with its own two outcomes, x−1 and x
+
1 , with the interpretation e.g.
x−1 : At station 1 the outcome was spin ’−’ on the x axis.
The picture to have is that the three stations are widely separated, but that
at each station the events come in rapid succession. Keep in mind that our
theoretical language implies little or nothing in the system/state vocabulary,
much less in the language of classical physics, much less in the language of
quantum mechanics. What happened happened; that’s it. We record in
the following “stipulations” the minimal story that quantum mechanics, no
doubt, tells.
Stipulation 1
• We use labels {1, 2, 3} for the three “stations,” labels {x, y} for the
two “measurement-types,” and labels {−,+} for the two “outcome-
types.” (The three quoted phrases are to be taken only as heuristic.
Theoretically the labels we use are just labels; the suggested concepts
do not figure as part of theory.) We use i and j as ranging over
{1, 2, 3}.
• We shall consider three initial events Ii, six stable events xi, yi, and
twelve outcome events x−i , x
+
i , y
−
i , y
+
i .
• These events fit together into spreads as follows. For i = 1, 2, 3, σi, σxi ,
and σyi are spreads, where σi = Ii → {xiyi} and σxi = xi →
{
x−i x
+
i
}
and σyi = yi →
{
y−i y
+
i
}
. It follows from the stability of xi and yi that
for i = 1, 2, 3, σ∗i = Ii →
{
x−i x
+
i y
−
i y
+
i
}
is a spread.
• These spreads fit together into 3-spreads as follows: Σ123 = {σ1σ2σ3},
Σ∗123 = {σ∗1σ∗2σ∗3}. We will also consider the following 3-spreads:
Σxxx = {σx1σx2σx3}
Σxxy = {σx1σx2σy3}
Σxyx = {σx1σy2σx3}
Σxyy = {σx1σy2σy3}
(12)
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That σi and the σ
x
i , σ
y
i are spreads already gives us the following spatio-
temporal information: for i = 1, 2, 3, we have Ii < xi, yi < x
−
i , x
+
i , y
−
i , y
+
i .
The following stipulation is additional.
Stipulation 2 The 3-spread Σ∗123 is space-like. This means that the sta-
tions are sufficiently far apart in a space-like sense, and the events at each
station are sufficiently close in a time-like sense, so as to guarantee that no
measurement outcome at one station has the initial of a distinct station in
its causal past. A fortiori, Σ123 and all the 3-spreads in (12) are spacelike.
Stipulation 3 The following stipulations are based on quantum mechanics
(see Section 1).
• An outcome vector of the 3-spread Σ∗123 (and hence an outcome vector
of a 3-spread in (12)) is consistent if and only if (i) there is a mixture
of x and y and an even number of minuses, or (ii) there is no mixture
of x and y and an odd number of minuses.
• Here are four examples, all used below.
(
x+1 x
−
2 x
+
3
)
, which is an out-
come vector of Σxxx, is consistent (no mixture of x and y, odd −).
Each of
(
x+1 x
−
2 y
+
3
)
,
(
x+1 y
+
2 y
−
3
)
and
(
x+1 y
−
2 x
+
3
)
(an outcome vector of
respectively Σxxy,Σxyy and Σxyx), is inconsistent (mixed x and y, odd
number of minuses).
• Furthermore, Σ123 is maximally consistent: no setting of measurement
type at one station can be prohibited by any selection of measurement
types at the other stations. The same fact can be restated by saying
that all of the 3-spreads in question are minimally consistent. The
3-spreads in (12) are none of them, however, maximally consistent.
Instead these 3-spreads each has a property intermediate between min-
imal consistency and maximal consistency: Each is 1-consistent, which
is to say of each that the joint realization of its measurement settings
(initials) permits the later occurrence of any single outcome of any of
its spreads (though of course not jointly!).
An inconsistent outcome vector of a 1-consistent space-like n-spread is
what sends us in search of a common cause. And maybe there is one. We
do not prove that there isn’t. Instead, we prove something weaker.
12
Theorem 4.1 There is no single spread σ that is a common cause for every
inconsistent outcome vector of each of the four 3-spreads Σxxx,Σxxy,Σxyy
and Σxyx.
This theorem rules out, or seems to rule out, that the “gedanken spin-
conserving decay,” if analyzed as an initial having a variety of possible
outcomes, could serve as the single common-cause explanation of all the
measurement correlations.
Proof. Suppose for reductio that σ is a common cause of each incon-
sistent outcome vector of each of the 3-spreads Σxxx,Σxxy,Σxyy and Σxyx.
Therefore, even without a full analysis of the concept of a common cause,
it is a part of our supposal that CC2 and CC3 hold for σ and each of
Σxxx,Σxxy,Σxyy and Σxyx.
We begin by choosing an outcome O of σ. CC2 for Σxxx implies that O
is consistent with the set of initials {x1x2x3} of Σxxx. This implies by Fact 1
that O is consistent with at least one consistent outcome vector of Σxxx. At
this point we ought to pick an arbitrary such consistent outcome vector, but
instead we ask you to settle for a persuasive example:
(
x+1 x
−
2 x
+
3
)
, known to
be consistent by Stipulation 3. So since O is consistent with the outcome
vector
(
x+1 x
−
2 x
+
3
)
, by Fact 1
O is consistent individually with each of x+1 , x
−
2 and x
+
3 .
Now consider that
(
x+1 x
−
2 y
+
3
)
must by Stipulation 3 be inconsistent. So
by CC3 for Σxxy, O must be inconsistent with one of those outcomes in-
dividually. But O is consistent with each of the first two, so it must be
that
O is inconsistent with y+3 .
CC2 for Σxxy implies that O is consistent with the initials {x1x2y3} of Σxxy.
By Fact 1 O is therefore consistent with the initial y3 of σ
y
3 . The outcomes
of σy3 are y
+
3 and y
−
3 . By Fact 1 O must be consistent with one of these two
outcomes. Since O is inconsistent with the former, it must be that
O is consistent with y−3 .
Next consider the outcome vector
(
x+1 y
+
2 y
−
3
)
of Σxyy. By Stipulation 3 it is
inconsistent, and so by CC3 for Σxyy, together with previously established
consistencies, it follows that
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O is inconsistent with y+2 .
Lastly, consider
(
x+1 y
−
2 x
+
3
)
, which by Stipulation 3 is inconsistent. By CC3
for Σxyx, together with previously established consistencies, we have that
O is inconsistent with y−2 .
But the inconsistency of O with both y+2 and y
−
2 implies, by Stipulation 3
and Fact 1, the inconsistency of O with y2. This contradicts the implication
of CC2 for Σxyx, by way of Fact 1, that O is consistent with y2, and concludes
the reductio .
That of course was a proof by example. To generalize, recast the argu-
ment by replacing the definite labels with variables.
✷
5 Limitations
There seem to be three ways Our World might be:
Level I. Deterministic, that is, there is only one history.
Level II. Indeterministic, but without any “strange” correlations between spa-
tially separated happenings. In other words, each inconsistent outcome
vector of each space-like n-spread has a common-cause explanation.
Level III. Indeterministic, and with “strange” correlations between spatially sep-
arated happenings.
The strength of our result is that it establishes the relation between a
Bell-like phenomenon and a no-common-cause-like phenomenon with abso-
lute rigor, relying on the causal ordering in Our World as sole primitive. As
we announced at the outset, however, there are limitations.
• A frequent interpretation of the GHSZ story as well as the other Bell-
like theorems is that they show that certain phenomena predicted by
quantum mechanics (but describable pre-theoretically, without quan-
tum mechanics) are incompatible with determinism. One of us has else-
where questioned the legitimacy of this interpretation as arising from
insufficient care in applying the usual formalism (Szabo´ 1995a,b). Cer-
tainly our proof cannot bear such an interpretation, because it begins
14
by stipulating the existence of certain spreads, which are explicitly in-
deterministic phenomena. We may in fact be permitted to doubt that
other proofs fare better in this respect. Although these proofs are not
sufficiently rigorous to be sure, they seem to share with our proof the
hypothesis that indeterministic phenomena occur.
• Our proof of Theorem 4.1 makes no use of the causal-priority condition
CC1 of Definition 3.7. More work is needed in understanding the
interplay of the idea of causal priority with other concepts. We need
especially to advance our understanding of the proposition that the
values of certain measurements cannot be arranged in advance.
• Bell-like theorems are often interpreted as showing that certain phe-
nomena predicted by quantum mechanics are inconsistent with the
principle of the common cause; or, in other words, that these phenom-
ena involve space-like correlations without a common cause. We are in
this paper explicit that Theorem 4.1 does not say, simply, that there
are correlations without a common cause. Instead, it says what it can
prove: There are certain sets of correlations such that one cannot find
a single common-cause locus for all of them. In other words, although
Theorem 4.1 does not strictly imply that Our World belongs to Level
III, it moves us sharply in that direction. So even though our result
succeeds in ruling out that a single “gedanken decay” can account for
all the correlations, its limited nature suggests the interest in finding
a better theorem.
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